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LAW, STATISTICS, AND THE REFERENCE CLASS
PROBLEM
Edward K. Cheng
Preview of: Edward K Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference
Class Problem, 109 Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming Dec. 2009).
Statistical data are powerful, if not crucial, pieces of evidence in the
courtroom. Whether one is trying to demonstrate the rarity of a DNA
profile, estimate the value of damaged property, or determine the
likelihood that a criminal defendant will recidivate, statistics often have
an important role to play. Statistics, however, raise a number of serious
challenges for the legal system, including concerns that they are difficult
to understand, are given too much deference from juries, or are easily
manipulated by the parties' experts. In this preview piece, I address one
of these challenges, known as the "reference class problem," and sketch
a solution that I develop at greater length in my forthcoming Essay.'
I. THE REFERENCE CLASS PROBLEM
The reference class problem arises from a basic observation: When
we make statistical inferences about a specific case, those inferences
depend critically on how we group or classify that case. To illustrate,
imagine that plaintiff contracts cancer after being exposed to a chemical
spill of a known carcinogen. To establish that the spill is the cause of her
cancer, plaintiff attempts to show that her cancer risk doubled after
exposure.2 So far, the litigation seems pretty straightforward, but then

Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Many thanks to Elina Shindelman for
research assistance in preparing this Sidebar companion piece, and the Brooklyn Law
School Dean's Summer Research Fund for generous support. For a comprehensive list of
acknowledgments, please see Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference
Class Problem, 109 Colun. L. Rev. (forthcoming Dec. 2009).
1. Edward K. Cheng, A Practical Solution to the Reference Class Problem, 109
Colum. L. Rev. (forthcoming Dec. 2009).
2. See 3 David L. Faigman et al., Modern Scientific Evidence § 23:27, at 249 (2008)
("Most courts ... have concluded a plaintiff can reach a jury if she can present
epiderniological studies indicating at least a doubling of the risk of injury due to exposure
to a substance .... ).
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we face a dilemma. What statistic should we use to estimate plaintiffs
cancer risk? Should we use the risk for the general population, or
should we be more specific? White females under the age of fifty?
Residents of Littleton County with no family history of cancer? In other
words, in describing cancer risk, how should we break down the
population: by age, gender, geography, profession, or something else?
In any litigation, parties will invariably offer different classifications
in the hope of gaining some advantage. To minimize her background
risk, our plaintiff may suggest using women under the age of fifty with no
family history of cancer as the relevant group. In contrast, the defendant
will focus on other attributes, such as the fact that she is a smoker or
takes hormone supplements. Faced with these conflicting statistics, what
is a jury to do? One natural response is to use all of the information
about the plaintiff-but that would result in a class of one person, the
plaintiff herself, and that singular class does not enable us to make any
statistical inferences at all.
The reference class problem thus presents a serious issue. The use
of statistics is supposed to increase objectivity and rigor, yet as I describe
it above, statistics appear almost infinitely malleable: As long as counsel
manipulates the reference class sufficiently, he can arrive at any
background risk number he wants. Indeed, rather than fulfill their
promise as a neutral basis for decisionmaking, statistics suddenly appear
to be nothing but rhetorical tricks that advocates can deploy in court.
Worse yet, this problem is not confined to toxic tort cases; it
arguably infects every use of statistics in the law. For example, when
courts value property for eminent domain, taxation, or insurance, one
standard method is to look at comparable properties. But which
properties are in fact "comparable" and what attributes of a home or lot
should be used for the valuation? The choice of reference class can
affect the valuation considerably. In DNA cases, prosecutors often
emphasize the random match probability (RMP), the probability that a
person chosen at random from the population will have the same profile
as the one found at the crime scene. Yet, what population is appropriate
for calculating the RMP?
The entire human population?
The
defendant's racial subgroup? The city in which the crime occurred?
From an intuitive standpoint, the above discussion may seem
somewhat alarmist. After all, just because one can manipulate statistical
inferences by cleverly selecting reference classes does not necessarily
mean that a jury will buy them. Using the category of white females
under age fifty to estimate cancer risk seems natural and hence
legitimate. Using the category "women who own blue handbags, like
sushi, and drive a red sedan" does not. But relying on the jury's powers
of intuition carries two problems. First, mindful of the jury's skepticism,
the parties will never offer outrageous reference classes. They will
instead choose plausible (but still conflicting) ones to advance their case.
Under these conditions, the jury's intuitive judgment is largely
unhelpful, and its choices effectively arbitrary. Second, to rely solely on
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intuition is to surrender the goal of using statistics to inject greater
objectivity and rigor into legal decisionnaking. As Ron Allen and Mike
Pardo recently noted, if reference class selection ultimately boils down to
subjective and intuitive judgment, then statistical models of evidence
have not advanced the field by much.
But what if we could find a way to make this intuition about the
"reasonableness" of reference classes more rigorous?
Providing a
principled method for choosing one reference class over another would
arguably solve the reference class problem, or at least restrict its
potential for mischief. To add this rigor, my proposal draws a close
analogy to the model selection problem in statistics and applies those
concepts and methods to the reference class problem.
II. MODEL SELECTION

A straightforward way to understand model selection is to consider
the problem of fitting a line or curve to a set of points.' For example,
assume we would like to predict a student's GPA based on the number of
hours he/she studies. We collect the data shown in Figure la, and then
the question becomes, what exactly is the relationship? The most
obvious answer is a simple linear relationship, as in Figure lb. However,
the slight curve in the data points might suggest a quadratic relationship,
as in Figure ic. We can fit even more complex curves, such as the fourth
degree polynomial in Figure Id. In any event, we have multiple
candidates for models and no obvious principle for choosing one over
another.
We can of course select curves based on intuitive judgment. For
example, the fitted curve in Figure id is obviously overcomplex: Study
hours and GPA are unlikely to be related in this way. Indeed, this kind
of intuition may be what underlies the time-honored principle of
Occam's Razor.5 But intuition does not tell us how or why the curve is
excessively or unnecessarily complex. Intuition is neither precise nor
objective. It can exclude the fourth degree model with ease, but has a
harder time choosing between the linear and quadratic curves.
The statistics literature, however, does offer a more rigorous
perspective on the model selection problem. Complex models like
Figure Id are problematic because they are "overfitted." The problem
with overfitted models is that they erroneously incorporate the random
noise that accompanies real world data. As a result, the predictions they

3. See RonaldJ. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical
Models of Evidence, 36 J. Legal Stud. 107, 115 (2007) ("[T]he question of which
[reference class is better will] . . . be the subject of argument and, ultinately,judgment.").
4. See generally Walter Zucchini, An Introduction to Model Selection, 44 J.
Mathematical Psychol. 41 (2000) (offering short and less technical introduction to
concepts in model selection).
5. See, e.g., Lewis S. Feuer, The Principle of Simplicity, 24 Phil. Sci. 109, 109 (1957)
("Entities are not to be multiplied unnecessarily." (emphasis omitted)).
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make become less accurate than if they had simply ignored the noise. In
the GPA example, if presented with a new set of students and their study
hours, the overfitted model will make more errors in predicting GPA
than a simpler model. So we have a classic tradeoff. Too simple a
model, and it will fail to identify the underlying relationship and have
low accuracy. Too complex, and it will incorporate too much random
noise and be similarly inaccurate.
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Figure 1: Example Fits to Observed Data Points
To perform this balancing between fit and complexity, statisticians
have developed various model selection criteria." These criteria operate
as rating systems, allowing researchers to compare different models and
select the "best" one.
III. A SOLUTION
At this point, the deep parallels between model selection and the
reference class problem are probably evident. Overly narrow reference
classes are essentially overly complex models-they take into account too
many attributes and run the risk of incorporating noise into their
6. See Kenneth P. Burnham & David R. Anderson, Model Selection and Multimodel
Inference 31-37 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing the need to balance fit and complexity and
various model selection methods).
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estimates or predictions. Conversely, overly broad reference classes are
like underfit models-they fail to incorporate enough of the information
in the data.
Indeed, as I argue in the Essay, the reference class and model
selection problems are precisely one and the same. As a result, model
selection criteria can solve the reference class problem for all practical
purposes in legal proceedings. Choosing a reference class need not be
arbitrary, subjective, or intuitive, but rather can be relatively objective
and quantifiable. Juries do have principles for selecting which statistics
to use to estimate a plaintiffs background risk, a house's market value,
or a DNA profile's random match probability.
Predictably, this claim is subject to a number of limitations, the most
important of which is that the proposed solution only eliminates the
reference class problem in the legal context. The reason is that no one
has yet figured out how to find the single best model for a given
phenomenon.
(That problem is exceptionally difficult, if not
impossible, to solve.) But as lawyers, we do not need to find the absolute
best reference class to resolve issues in court. The adversarial system
only requires courts or juries to mediate disputes between the parties, so
they just need to decide whose proposed reference class is better. And
model selection criteria perform that comparative function handily.
CONCLUSION

Beyond the academic aspects of the proposed solution, my hope is
that this project will alert practitioners and courts to two fundamental
things. For practitioners, as one philosopher of science aptly said, "the
reference class problem is your problem too."' Whenever you encounter
a statistic, think deeply about the underlying reference class. Changing
the reference class may change the statistic, and thus allow you to
challenge your opponent, make a powerful rhetorical argument, or in
the best case scenario, affect the outcome. For courts, the lesson is that
the reference class problem is not as intractable as it first seems. The
choice of reference class need not be left entirely to ajury's subjective or
intuitive judgment. Rather, statistical tools exist for making reference
class selection more analytical, a development that will hopefully make
statistics more welcome in the future.
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